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This essay offers some reflections on the proximity of Thea Astley’s masterful novel of the 
Queensland frontier, A Kindness Cup, and a major shift in Australian history writing that 
occurred in the 1970s and 80s with the emergence of Aboriginal history. Several critics have 
argued that Astley’s novel reflects the political and intellectual spirit of this moment, 
epitomised in the work of figures like W.E.H. Stanner, Henry Reynolds and C.D. Rowley 
(Sheridan, 12-13; Lever 130-1). The novel gives us an unflinching account of the violence of 
the Queensland frontier and dramatizes practices of national remembering and forgetting. 
Without disputing this claim, I want to do something slightly different. I will suggest that 
Astley’s novel is also a reflection on the writing of history that offers a critique of some of the 
political and affective investments that we may place in the work of recovering the past. In 
this, Astley’s novel does something quite different from the historical work of her 
contemporaries, asking a series of questions about the relationship between remembering and 
redressing violence: Why do we want to recover and remember a violent past?; What do we 
hope this process will achieve?; What blind spots inhabit the faith we place in the exposé?; 
And how can we be so sure of the difference between retelling violence and replaying or re-
enacting violence?  
We can link the emergence of this new tradition of history writing to W.E.H. Stanner’s Boyer 
lectures for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, delivered in 1968, in which Stanner 
coined the phrase ‘The Great Australian Silence.’ The lectures are often credited with ushering 
in a radical history writing in Australia intent upon breaking the silence on Aboriginal 
dispossession and frontier war (Attwood 19).  ‘The Great Australian Silence’ was born out of 
persistent practices of disremembering that had allowed settler Australians to ignore the story 
of Aboriginal dispossession and the contemporary situation of Aboriginal Australians. Stanner 
argued that there was a structural repression at the heart of Australia’s understanding of its past 
and that this could not be explained by ‘absent mindedness’ but was instead, ‘a structural 
matter, a view from a window which has been carefully placed to exclude a whole quadrant of 
the landscape’ (24).  
Stanner’s call for a new kind of Australian history writing was answered over the next 
twenty years: C.D. Rowley’s The Destruction of Aboriginal Society (1970), Henry 
Reynolds’s The Other Side of the Frontier (1981), and Lyndal Ryan’s The Aboriginal 
Tasmanians (1981) were some of the earliest and most significant historical studies to 
engage with the Indigenous experience of the frontier. Stanner’s lectures addressed both 
Australian history and Australian historical memory, notably why the Australian past had 
come to be remembered or forgotten in certain ways. The tradition of scholarship that 
Stanner ushered in was therefore highly self-conscious about the way that history writing, 
although it might be about the past, ultimately addresses the present and so is 
‘inescapably political’ (1), to quote Reynolds in The Other Side of the Frontier.  
Critics including Susan Sheridan and Susan Lever have argued that A Kindness Cup should be 
situated in relation to this new tradition of Australian history writing (Sheridan 12-13; Lever 
130-1). The novel is set in Queensland in the 19th Century and takes its impetus from a selection 
of historical events and documents. It recounts the massacre of an Aboriginal tribe, a horrific 
act of sadism against a white man who tries to warn the tribe about it, and the town’s concerted 
forgetting of these acts of violence. And it tells the story of a misguided but well-intentioned 
school teacher, Dorahy, who wants the truth of the town’s violent foundations revealed and 
remembered. Like Stanner’s lectures and much of the work that followed them, Astley’s novel 
demonstrates the complicity between foundational nationalist mythologies (such as, for 
example, the idea of the pioneering spirit) and the disremembering of Aboriginal dispossession. 
In this sense, while A Kindness Cup is a novel about what happened on the frontier, it is also a 
novel about historical memory, about how this violence has been disremembered and the 
ongoing affects of that disremembering. As Sheridan states, Astley ‘dramatizes white society’s 
capacity to suppress knowledge of its crimes against Aboriginal people’ and ‘poses questions 
which derive from cultural contexts shared with the historians who were her contemporaries’ 
(12).  
 
What has been less well noted, however, is how profoundly different Astley’s novel is from 
the work of these contemporaneous historians. At the crux of this difference is its deep 
ambivalence, even pessimism, about the political and affective use of historical recovery. 
Following Bain Attwood, we can argue that much of the historical work that emerged in this 
period was either explicitly or implicitly driven by the optimistic belief that looking honestly 
at the Australian past, and particularly its violence and injustice, could be the basis of 
democratic change in race relations in Australian society (Attwood 37-40). By contrast, 
Astley’s novel is primarily about the damage done by one well-meaning individual’s attempt 
to bring the history of frontier violence to light. At the novel’s conclusion, the exposure of 
historical atrocities at a town meeting leads to an outburst of mob violence that is structurally 
very similar to the violence that has been exposed. As critics have commented, Astley’s work 
is often characterized by irony, moral ambiguity and a lack of ideological closure (Dale 1999; 
Adelaide 1997; Sheridan, 2008). The conclusion to A Kindness Cup, in which the efforts of the 
conscientious objector are shockingly thwarted, is a striking example of Astley’s use of 
situational irony and her refusal to give readers an easy moral response to the violent Australian 
past.  
 
I will argue here that when we situate A Kindness Cup in its intellectual and historical context 
we can read it as re-inflecting some of the underlying investments that will come to structure 
an emerging tradition of critical history writing in Australia. What the novel makes problematic 
in this tradition is not its politics: like most of the work in Aboriginal history emerging at this 
time, Astley’s novel is left-wing, anti-racist, and committed to rethinking the national story. 
Rather, the novel critiques certain investments that we may have in projects of historical 
recovery and what I will call the politics of exposure. This can be understood as a politics that 
works from the assumption that violence, inequality, and injustice are mostly the result of 
ignorance and that therefore better knowledge will help prevent them. Stated in more concrete 
terms, the novel’s bleak conclusion can be read to problematize a kind of politicized historical 
scholarship that works from the guiding assumption that knowing what happened on the 
frontier will help us prevent a replay of racial violence in Australia.  
 
What remains unthinkable in this familiar political and intellectual mode is the idea that a fully 
cognisant subject might be no better equipped to prevent violence or, perhaps more shockingly, 
that the subject was always already cognisant, that we have always already known about this 
violence. The novel, I suggest, asks what fantasies and blind spots lie behind our uncritical 
investment in the politics of the exposé. I also argue that Astley presents the disturbing 
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possibility that this politics may be inhabited by a desire for historical closure that carries within 
it the sprig of violence. Written in 1975 on the cusp of this new tradition of history writing, 
Astley’s novel assists us to think through some of the investments that we may make in 
practices of historical recovery and their limitations.  
 
I turn now to some of the key ideas that structure a small selection of the historical work that 
emerged in this period. My aim is to clarify what I am calling ‘the politics of exposure’ and to 
demonstrate how it structures this work.  
 
In his memoir Why Weren’t We Told, Henry Reynolds looks back at his career as a radical 
historian. Describing the democratic sentiment that drove his historical work he writes,   
 
Much critical, revisionist history springs from the idea that Australia should do 
better and is capable of doing so. It is written in hope and expectation of reform, 
crafted in the confidence that carefully marshalled, clearly expressed argument 
can persuade significant numbers of Australians to change their mind and redirect 
their sympathies. Beyond that confidence in individuals is a firm belief in the 
capacity of Australian democracy to respond to new ideas which in time can 
reshape policies and recast institutions, laws and customs. (245) 
 
There are two main assumptions at play in this statement. Firstly, that present injustices have 
their basis in historical injustices. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, that the rational 
exposure of the origins of these injustices will shift public sympathies and initiate democratic 
reform. For an example of the kind of work that Reynolds is referring to here we can look at 
C.D. Rowley’s masterful 1970 publication, The Destruction of Aboriginal Society. Rowley was 
a historian, social scientist and public administrator in charge of a large scale, publicly funded 
studies of Aboriginal people in contemporary Australian society. In this major text, Rowley 
argued that better historical knowledge was the key to understanding the situation of 
contemporary Aboriginal people and he suggested that this historical knowledge would shift 
public opinion. He stated: 
 
no adequate assessment of the Aboriginal predicament can be made so long as 
the historical dimension is lacking; it is the absence of information on background 
which has made it easy for intelligent persons in each successive generation to 
accept the stereotype of an incompetent group. (9)  
 
Reading these quotes side by side we can see that both Rowley and his successor, Reynolds 
work with the belief that the perpetuation of historical injustices, what Rowley refers to as ‘the 
stereotype of an incompetent group,’ is the result of broad historical ignorance. And they also 
suggest, optimistically, that better historical knowledge will lead to an expansion of empathy 
in the Australian people.  
 
As well as linking history writing with reform (both reform in the realm of policy and in the 
broader public realm in the sense of reforming the attitude of the settler) some histories 
produced at this time also contain the more abstract hope that critical historical recovery work 
might perform a work of restorative justice. The following quote is from Richard Broome’s 
Aboriginal Australians, from 1982: 
 
The Aborigines have been denigrated and oppressed, while the Europeans have 
generally assumed the dehumanizing role of the oppressors, and have had a false 
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sense of their own superiority. All Australians must see history for what it was, 
and is, before any mature Australian outlook can develop. Also natural justice for 
Aborigines can only be achieved and the colonial relationship of dominance and 
subordinance between black and white be ended, when Australians are honest 
about their past. (6) 
  
The justice to which Broome refers here, what he calls ‘natural justice,’ is achieved by seeing 
the past clearly and honestly. And to the historian falls the job of enabling this form of justice 
by revealing the past, without filter and ‘for what it was,’ and thus allowing the settler to 
acknowledge their own implication in that past.  
 
It is not my intention here to undermine or critique the optimistic, democratic investments of 
this tradition, but as noted earlier to show that A Kindness Cup carries none of this optimism. 
The novel is based upon historical recovery work not entirely removed from that undertaken 
by contemporaneous historians: it takes its impetus from real historical events and documents 
and it is unflinching in its reconstruction of frontier violence and cruelty. However, it refuses 
to see this work in and of itself as democratising, or to call this recovery work a form of justice. 
In A Kindness Cup the exposure of violence itself operates as a form of violence. 
 
In the novel’s acknowledgement, Astley calls A Kindness Cup a ‘cautionary fable.’ The fable 
as a form works by presenting the reader with a bad example: a central figure that the reader is 
led to quickly identify with only to be shown that this identification was misguided and then to 
reverse it. In the tortoise and the hare, for example, we first identify with the hare and with his 
arrogant belief that he can nap and beat the tortoise. By the end of the story we realize both the 
hare and our identification with this character were misguided. As Thomas Keenan argues, in 
the fable we identify in order to dis-identify (45-7).  
 
In A Kindness Cup, readers are led to form this kind of encouraged, but ultimately misguided 
identification with Dorahy, a school teacher who wants to uncover and expose the massacre of 
an Aboriginal tribe and a horrific act of sadism against Charles Lunt, a white man in the 
community who objected and tried to give the tribe warning. Moreover, readers are both 
structurally and morally aligned with Dorahy for most of the novel. However, like in the 
traditional fable, the use of situational irony at the novel’s conclusion works to reveal both the 
mistake of Dorahy’s investments in this project of exposure and our own mistaken investment 
in Dorahy.  
 
Halfway through the novel Charles Lunt is accosted by a punitive party in his home where he 
is caring for a sick Aboriginal man. The sick man is shot dead and Lunt lashed to his body 
before the party move on to a massacre of the Aboriginal man’s tribe. The quote that follows 
presents perhaps the central image of the novel, the figure of white conscience lashed face to 
face with the Aboriginal dead: 
 
Sweetman ushered a Judas “Sorry, old man” and the rest of them seized him then. 
One of them went outside and brought in some saddle ropes and although Lunt 
fought them back a rifle butt knocked the sense out of him and they lashed him 
strongly with a lot of unnecessary rope to the dead man and then both of them to 
the bed. Face to face. Lunt lay with his lips shoved into flesh already cold. (47) 
 
The novel begins however not with the massacre or its lead up but rather with Dorahy’s return 
to the town twenty years later for ‘Back to the Taws,’ a celebration of the early years of 
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pioneering and commemoration of the town’s ‘founders.’ The subject of the novel then is not 
only the massacre itself but also the question of how it will be remembered. Dorahy’s aim in 
returning to the town is to uncover the massacre and to bring the truth of the town’s foundation 
to light in a ‘hope for delayed justice.’ (60) Dorahy claims to want justice for Lunt, the white 
man who was sadistically abused, and for the Indigenous people who died in the massacre. ‘It’s 
not just you’ he says to Charles Lunt, ‘It’s the old man as well. It’s Kowaha. It’s her husband. 
It’s Kowaha’s child.’ (56) Dorahy, we might argue, sees himself as in some sense beholden to 
the dead and the abused and as carrying a kind of ethical responsibility, what the novel will 
describe as a responsibility of ‘conscience,’ to speak on their behalf. The question of justice 
then, for Dorahy, is explicitly linked to the possibility of historical recovery and the act of 
speaking this history. Justice will be achieved through the recovery and exposure of historical 
violence and speaking of this violence in the name of the dead.  
 
Dorahy’s obsession with exposing the town’s violent past is contrasted with its celebration of 
the past, a celebration that ignores or perhaps more precisely is indifferent to the massacre. 
This forgetting is serviced by remembering of a different kind: the memorialization of the 
bravery of the early history of settlement, stories of ‘self sacrifice’ (91), ‘old friends’ (89), 
‘recollections and memories’ (129), the ‘marriage of place and person’ (90). By coupling the 
story of a massacre with the story of a town’s commemorative celebration Astley comments 
on the way that nationalist myths both require and enable the erasure of frontier violence. 
Slanted remembrance and tradition, Astley shows us, are perhaps key to the ways the past can 
be misrepresented, and indeed denied.  
 
We might argue then that although this is a novel about frontier massacres, the central conflict 
it recounts is not really between settlers and Indigenous people. Rather it is between two 
different kinds of settler intent on very different versions of the national past: one that is 
committed to proud and affirming stories and one that is committed to exposing truth and 
violence. For Dorahy, the act of remembering in this context takes on a degree of moral 
significance: it becomes for Dorahy a way to refuse complicity with a group of people who he 
believes want to forget the violent actions that characterised that past. Thus the following 
exchange with a town’s member: 
 
‘You shouldn’t have come back here in the spirit of criticism. That’s all over now. 
So long ago no one remembers.’ 
‘I remember’  
‘You won’t forget you mean.’ (50) 
 
While Astley stages this conflict in the nineteenth century, it is presented, both thematically 
and structurally as an allegory for a conflict in and for the present: the question of how this past 
will be remembered, while it is Dorahy’s question, is most importantly a question for the 
reader. In this sense the novel dramatises the conflict that was laid out in Stanner’s lectures 
about remembering and forgetting the history of the frontier. This is also the conflict that would 
re-surface in the History Wars of the 1990s. And we might note that like in A Kindness Cup in 
these debates one side, the left, claimed a moral responsibility for the work of remembering. 
There is in this sense something very prescient about Dorahy’s conflict.  
 
For most of the novel readers identify with Dorahy, both structurally and thematically. We 
identify with Dorahy because he seems to be taking a moral stance against the crimes of the 
frontier. And we also identify with Dorahy because we are structurally aligned with his position 
in relation to these crimes. Like the reader, Dorahy is neither victim nor perpetrator but rather 
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witness to this violence. Dorahy does not participate in these crimes but he sees them, as Astley 
makes sure we do as readers. Dorahy in this sense embodies the same moral questions that the 
novel presents to the reader: how do we remember a violent past? What is the responsibility of 
the witness in relation to this past? And how much responsibility does one bear for crimes 
committed in one’s name? The punitive party, we find out, sees itself as acting on behalf of the 
whole community, as protecting ‘those things we cherish … The food from our children’s 
mouths’ (38). It is perhaps not too much of a stretch to say that for Astley, the settler reader is 
also part of the community in whose name the punitive party acts, as the party sees itself as 
laying the foundations for future generations.  
 
For Dorahy the desire to link the work of remembering violence with justice is not merely 
whimsical. Rather it responds to and tries to repair the blatant failure of the justice system on 
the frontier. A significant portion of the novel recounts a botched trial that takes place after the 
massacre, and which serves as a cover up. Astley took much of the material for the court scenes 
from archival transcripts of the Select Committee on the Native Police Force from 1861. Her 
dramatization demonstrates that the law was unable to recognize frontier violence as a crime 
in large part because it could not acknowledge the complicity between pioneering or the 
settlement of the land and murder and dispossession. Indeed, the failure of justice takes place 
not so much because of the capacity for individuals to lie or deny responsibility, but because 
the language of legal procedure, the rules of evidence, and the limits of legal citizenship all 
contribute to a systematic erasure of the Aboriginal victim and an inability to see the dead 
Aboriginal body. For example, the massacre is not described as a massacre or even as a 
shooting but rather as a ‘dispersal’ (53), a term that Astley takes directly from the transcript. 
There is no possibility of hearing evidence directly from Aboriginal people because at the time 
they were not able to testify in court and besides the dead cannot testify. Perhaps the most 
blatant miscarriage of justice is that although the shooting is, at one point, admitted it cannot 
be recognised as murder. Thus, while Buckmaster, the ringleader, admits to shooting and 
claims to have seen six dead bodies the ruling finds that, 
 
While there were certain irregularities in the proceedings of the day, the entire 
unhappy events were the result of wrongly placed enthusiasm, a perhaps too nice 
a sense of injustice and the understandable grievances of men who found the 
difficulty of living—and I mean pioneer living—aggravated to an unbearable 
pitch by the extra annoyance the blacks posed to their efforts. (126) 
 
For Dorahy, ‘going back,’ going ‘back to the Taws’ and going back over this past is impelled, 
in his own words, by ‘a hope for delayed justice’ (60). History writing, for Dorahy, becomes a 
redemptive space; the act of recounting past crimes, even those in which he was not directly 
involved, speaks to the structural silencing of the plaintiff by the courts. Dorahy, for instance, 
considers writing a piece about Charles Lunt and in his name called ‘Why I left town, by a 
victim’ (103). Here he sees it as his job to speak for and in the name of the victim. In response 
to the objection that this may not be his story to tell, he retorts that the story is ‘a part of local 
history’ (103). Dorahy conceives of history writing as the task of speaking in the name of the 
victim where the institutions of justice have failed and where their structure precludes the 
victim’s own voice.     
  
We might speculate briefly as to why and how historical recovery comes to take on this role, 
both for Dorahy and, I would argue, for historians working around the time of this novel. In 
The Juridical Unconscious Shoshana Felman argues that in the wake of the holocaust the law 
has been called on not just to decide an individual’s guilt or innocence but rather to ‘respond, 
JASAL: Journal of the Association for the Study of Australian Literature 18.3
SMITH: history writing and historical justice in Thea Astley 
6
Editor: Tony Simoes da Silva
in a larger manner, to the traumatic historical experience of the Holocaust and juridically 
confront the very trauma of race, of being a Jew in (Hitler’s) Europe’ (4). This, she suggests, 
is a form of ‘put[ting] history on trial.’ (11) The courtroom becomes the space in which this is 
acted out, particularly in the collective hearings on behalf of holocaust survivors where it is 
called on to hear the voices of history’s persecuted. (12) In Australia there has never been a 
legal arena in which to hear the crimes of the frontier. My suggestion would be then that in the 
absence of this, history writing and fiction become the space in which the crime is recounted, 
trauma aired, and justice optimistically supposed to be re-established. History writing in this 
sense takes on something of the role of the court procedure.  
 
So far I have demonstrated some of the ways that Dorahy makes the task of historical recovery 
a moral imperative and the logic by which this become a way of responding to the failure of 
the justice system to recognise frontier violence. I have also been suggesting that something of 
the logic of Dorahy’s thinking is at play in the work of historians working at the time Astley 
wrote this novel. Dorahy can be read as a figure for the revisionist historian. I want now to turn 
to Astley’s critique of Dorahy. For if this is a fable in which we are led to identify with Dorahy 
only in order to be shown the error of that identification, we now need to explore what, for 
Astley, is misguided about Dorahy’s project.  
 
In the final scene Dorahy and his friend and ally Snoggers Boyd attend a commemorative event 
in the town hall and in front of all the people of the town recount the massacre twenty years 
ago and the sadistic abuse of Charles Lunt. In response, a small group of men rise up and set 
upon the whistle blowers. They attack Charles Lunt  and push him down the stairs and his fall 
seems to re-enact a woman’s leap and fall from a cliff during the massacre. They drag Dorahy 
and Boyd outside and beat them up. Dorahy throughout the novel has seen this recounting of 
the massacre as a form of belated justice, but ultimately his project backfires, leading to a re-
enactment of the violence it set out to uncover.  
 
At the crux of Dorahy’s error is a blind faith in the political and moral value of the exposé. 
Dorahy’s obsession with telling the truth about the past is guided by the belief that where the 
justice system has failed to punish the culprits of the massacre his own exposé, twenty years 
later, will result in a retrospective exercise of justice. As he says, ‘it’s going to destroy … 
Buckmaster, Sweetman. They’ll be exposed for what they really are’ (120). The fantasy at play 
here is that ongoing injustice, in this case the celebration of murderers by the town, is mainly 
the result of mystification and that once the truth about Buckmaster and Sweetman is exposed 
they will be dethroned.  
 
Borrowing from Eve Sedgwick’s work on paranoid reading we can observe that what remains 
unthinkable for Dorahy is that even if the truth is fully exposed this may not change things or 
that ‘a fully initiated listener may remain indifferent or inimical or have no help to offer’ (138). 
And yet this is precisely what Dorahy’s own experience of the town might have suggested. In 
the trial, for instance, there is no obfuscation of the massacre but rather, more cynically, a 
refusal to prosecute the offenders. Snoggers Boyd observes that the townspeople were always 
aware of the massacre: ‘the whole town knew at the time but no one was prepared to make 
outright challenges’ (103).  
 
The true extent of Dorahy’s misunderstanding is revealed in the final moments when, as the 
‘hate pack’ (135) leave Dorahy and Boyd groaning in the dust, the two abused men hear the 
sounds of the celebration continuing, the townspeople raising their voices in a rendition of Auld 
Land Syne, ‘full throatedly ... roar[ing] chorus after chorus’ (135). What is most shocking and 
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surprising in this conclusion is not that the whistle blowers are silenced but rather that once the 
men are removed from the hall the celebration continues. Thus, the scandal the novel 
foregrounds is not the exposé itself, at least not in its content. And neither is it that the whistle 
blowers are punished. Rather, what is revealed through Dorahy and Boyd’s exposé (which 
perhaps was obvious all along) is the fact that everyone already knew but that they considered 
the information insignificant. Dorahy’s big mistake was to believe that there was a subject who 
would be shocked by his historical exposé.  
Returning to the idea that the novel can be read as a commentary on the figure of the historian 
we can compare this scene to the opening of Reynolds’s Why Weren’t We Told. The 
comparison is useful because the texts describe similar scenes: an educated man of conscience 
informing a public audience about the true history of the frontier. The difference is that where 
Astley gives us an audience that is both knowledgeable and indifferent to this history, 
Reynolds recalls an audience who is first ignorant, and then moved: 
After political meetings, after public forums, lectures, book readings, interviews, 
it hasn’t mattered where I spoke, what size the audience, what the occasion or the 
actual topic dealt with. 
Why didn’t we know? Why were we never told? (1) 
He continues: 
More to the point, they (the audience) felt that they should have known these 
things themselves and didn’t. They wished they had known them before. They 
believed their education should have provided the knowledge, the information 
and hadn’t done so. (2) 
Leaving aside the question of genre—the fact that one text is a memoir and the other a novel— 
and leaving aside, also, the question of historical setting, the fact that Reynolds’s describes 
his present while Astley’s novel is set in the nineteenth century, we can compare the 
construction of the settler subject and the historian in these parallel scenes. For Reynolds, the 
settler subject is genuinely ignorant about colonial violence. This ignorance, it is implied, is 
not the fault of any individual who may be in his audience but is rather the fault of the 
ideologically driven limitations of the education system. The question, ‘Why weren’t we 
ever told? is testament to the ignorance (and we might add innocence) across the country 
about the facts of Australian history, but perhaps more importantly to the fact that people 
have a genuine desire to know and to acknowledge that history. This is not a wilful 
ignorance the question seems to say. The historian, in this scenario, can speak out against 
the state’s perpetuated silences, providing an ignorant, but we might add, innocent, settler 
population with knowledge about their history. In contrast to this, Astley’s novel suggests 
that settler Australians have always known what happened on the frontier—they simply 
never cared too much about it. In this case it is Dorahy, the speaker, who is ignorant in that he 
has failed to realise that the violence he ‘uncovers’ is conspicuous rather than hidden.    
This comparison allows us to ask: to what extent does the politics of the exposé rest upon the 
fantasy of an innocent subject? The scene in Reynolds’s memoir, we might speculate, is 
the scene Dorahy fantasizes about, where an audience would be genuinely shocked and 
moved by the information disclosed and as a result the culprits exposed and expelled from the 
town. Yet both these scenarios depend on the idea that there is an innocent subject who did not 
and indeed could not know about the violence of the frontier and so is shocked into action by 
the revelation. 
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Dorahy, Astley suggests, is not just ineffective in his commitment to this fantasy about the 
redemptive work of historical recovery. By the end of the novel his exposure of violence has 
also initiated a repeat of that violence. As Lunt is set upon by the mob in the final moments of 
the novel he turns to Dorahy and mutters, ‘Damn you.’ (134) What is devastating about this is 
that Lunt suggests that the violence he is about to endure, a violence that seems to replay an 
earlier violence twenty years ago, has now, this second time, been initiated not by the people 
of the town but by Dorahy himself and by his obsession with historical exposure. The desire to 
reveal violence it seems, can manifest as or conjure further violence.  
 
What is the nature of this violence for Astley? In this moment we realize that a flavour of 
violence has run through Dorahy’s obsession with historical exposure all along—that he has 
found himself overtaken by affect that eerily recalls that which drove the punitive party. 
Dorahy is ‘greedy’ (83), ‘frantic’ (80), ‘sick with fury’ (99). The novel thus asks, to what extent 
does critique take its energy from that which it opposes? And what are the affective investments 
that drive the work of critique and exposure? Rita Felski has argued that forms and styles of 
criticism operate within particular affective registers (216), approaching their object through a 
certain matrix of feelings. Thus, for Felski, what Paul Ricoeur famously called the 
hermeneutics of suspicion, that is, a form of reading in which a critical detachment from the 
text is assumed in order to uncover its repressed or hidden meanings, is constituted by a 
particular and affect laden mode of relating to the text. For Felski, suspicious reading enables, 
‘guardedness rather than openness; aggression rather than submission; superiority rather than 
reverence; attentiveness rather than distraction; exposure rather than tact’ (222). 
 
Following Felski’s discussion we might posit Dorahy as a suspicious reader. At ‘Back to the 
Taws,’ he wants to keep himself detached and guarded in relation to the rousing and 
sentimental language of the ceremony and he holds himself aloof by counting clichés (90). 
Dorahy’s intellectual detachment is suspicious and critical in its orientation—indexing and 
analysing the ceremony’s rhetoric rather than letting it affect him. But Astley shows us that 
suspicious critique is a highly invested and affect laden exercise. As the ceremony continues 
Dorahy finds himself shouting at the crowd, ‘How many, eh, did you sacrifice?’ (91). The 
scene shows us something of the potential atmospheres that inhabit the work of critique and 
warn us of an aggression that may override its intentions.  
 
Another aspect of the violence that inhabits Dorahy’s project is its reliance on an appropriation 
of Lunt’s experience. For Dorahy, history writing and justice are aligned through the act of 
speaking in the name of the victim. However, the novel asks us to consider the difference 
between what it means to live with historical trauma and what it means to write history. As 
critics of trauma have argued, the traumatic experience is characterized by its resistance to 
narrative (Caruth; Felman). Lunt chooses not to speak of the incident and we might argue that 
in his desire to reveal what has happened Dorahy must, in some way, violate and misrepresent 
a crucial aspect of Lunt’s experience: its unspeakability. A question the novel asks then is: 
How does one make space for the victim’s trauma within the narrative closure of history writing 
when to write history is to erase something fundamentally true about that experience—its 
resistance to narrative? 
 
Finally, Astley suggests Dorahy’s need for a totalizing and we might say political solution to 
violence and the failure of justice through a public exposé overrides any small and individual 
acts of healing and responsibility that might take place. The key example of this is the 
individual work taken on by Lunt himself who, before the reunion, is living in another town 
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and has taken the now grown daughter of one of the victims into his employ as a cook and 
cleaner. While we might bring a critical eye to bear on the power dynamics within this 
relationship, within the logic of the text this is presented as a gesture of responsibility for what 
is perhaps the larger and more structural crime: the violent dispossession of the Indigenous 
population.  
 
The basis of Lunt’s ability to come to terms with the violence is an acknowledgment of his 
own complicity in the crime. He voices this position in response to Dorahy’s demand for 
justice: ‘It could so easily have been any of us who did it … the luck of the draw’ (56), Lunt 
reflects. The point here is not absolute moral relativism or to claim that there is no difference 
between doing it and not doing it. However, it does interrupt Dorahy’s fierce desire to affix 
blame for the attack. Lunt’s response in which he identifies with the criminal suggests that for 
the settler there may be no simple position of guilt or innocence in relation to frontier violence.  
As Fiona Probyn-Rapsey has argued an understanding of complicity can work to register the 
settler’s structural (as opposed to individual) and trans-historical (as opposed to localized) 
implication in colonial power relationships and colonial violence (69). 
 
To put it in more concrete terms, Lunt and Dorahy’s very presence on the land and as members 
of the community render them in some sense complicit in crimes committed by the party and 
in the name of the town. As the leaders will state, ‘We were interested only in what concerned 
the good of us all’ (130). Lunt’s small acts of acknowledging responsibility and attempting to 
heal, taken in relation to one of the Indigenous victims, can be read as emerging from a 
recognition of this complicity and the attempt to carve out a personal space that is not based on 
the violent politics of distinction that drive the punitive party and Dorahy’s own attempt to 
insist upon an absolute separation between the guilty and the innocent settler. Lunt’s small, 
moral, and incomplete response to the crime is presented by Astley as a way of continuing to 
live after violence. Dorahy’s hope for a totalizing political solution, by contrast, must not only 
erase these smaller acts but is also swept up in an oppositional fury that ties it to the affects and 
logics it seeks to move past.   
 
I have argued then that we can read Astley’s novel as offering a caution against some of the 
moral and affective investments that we might make in historical scholarship. It also show us 
something of the particular value of fiction for thinking about the past and in this it shifts the 
terms of some of the Australian debates about history and fiction that have raged over the last 
decade, particularly in relation to Kate Grenville’s The Secret River.  These debates disagreed 
over the relative value of history and literature as two different frameworks for accessing the 
past, with both sides seeking to claim the superior value of one form over the other. (Historians, 
and particularly Inga Clendinnen defended the value of careful historical scholarship against 
Grenville’s claim that fiction and the imaginative identifications of the writer could allow the 
reader a closer relationship to the past than the fragments of the archive.) Rather than 
attempting to attack or defend the value of history writing or historical fiction, in this essay I 
have asked how fiction might offer a reflection on the practice of history writing itself—
particularly history writing that takes up the violent and traumatic past. Of course, Astley’s 
novel is part of the tradition it seems to critique: the novel depends on historical recovery work 
and it reconstructs frontier violence. The value of the creative work however is that it is able 
to do this work while also attending to its limits, thus insisting that we hold open the space 
between historical recovery and historical justice.  
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